The effects of perceived quality on tuition and net tuition by Thomas, Isabella Xianxin
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Honors Theses Student Research
2018
The effects of perceived quality on tuition and net
tuition
Isabella Xianxin Thomas
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/honors-theses
Part of the Economics Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas, Isabella Xianxin, "The effects of perceived quality on tuition and net tuition" (2018). Honors Theses. 1338.
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/honors-theses/1338
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
The Effects of Perceived Quality on Tuition and Net Tuition 
by 
Isabella Xianxin Thomas  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Senior Thesis 
Submitted to: 
The Economics Department 
University of Richmond 
Richmond, VA 
 
April 27, 2018 
Advisor: Dr. Robert Schmidt  
 
 
 
 2 
Abstract 
This paper examines the effects of perceived quality on tuition and net tuition utilizing both 
direct and indirect measures to account for quality and the U.S News and World Ranking to 
measure perceived quality.  Tuition is the sticker price, whereas net tuition is the sticker price 
less discounts. Judgments of quality will be more apparent in tuition, therefore perceived quality 
and tuition should have a larger relationship than net tuition and perceived quality. When 
regressed with quality variables held constant on tuition and net tuition, effect of reputation on 
prices is captured. The coefficient for perceived quality on tuition had more significance than for 
net tuition. The implications are that changes in perceived quality impact prices regardless of 
actual quality.   
Introduction 
When choosing a college, classic investment theory states that an individual will weigh 
returns to college against the cost. If the future benefits exceed the future costs, then a student 
will choose to enroll (Oreopoulous and Petronijevic, 2013). In the last ten years, private 
universities averaged a 2.4% annual tuition increase adjusted for inflation. With the classic 
investment theory, one might expect to see a decline in enrollment with rising prices, but 
according to college board, college enrollment increased by 15% since 2005 (College Board, 
2016). For students to bear this increased marginal cost every year, they must believe that the 
added benefit or college quality is worth it.  
  Students may associate higher tuition with better quality.  Early studies showed that 
consumers believe price to be an indicator of quality (Leavitt, 1954). Scitovsky (1944) suggests 
that such behavior is not unreasonable as the basic law of demand and supply creates a hierarchal 
order of products based on price. Especially with expensive products, consumers have a ‘you-
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get-what-you-pay-for’ mentality, even if the customer shows no familiarity with the product 
prior to purchase (Rao and Monroe, 1989). Despite the theory behind this phenomenon, there 
have been no significant studies to demonstrate that a causal relationship between price and 
quality exists. However, it can generally be agreed upon that there is a positive relationship 
between price and perceived quality (Rao and Monroe, 1989).  
 Under this assumption, it is reasonable to hypothesize that students agree to pay rising 
prices based on perceived levels of quality. Rarely can consumers understand quality at a glance, 
and several studies show that customers will purchase products with relatively little information 
even when the financial burden is significant (Gerstner, 1985). Economists believe that prices 
influence decisions. In higher education, if prices do not reflect the benefits of quality, then there 
is a discrepancy between tuition costs and value, and consumers make the wrong decisions. In 
applying consumer behavior to the decision for selecting a college, this paper aims to understand 
what determines tuition.  
This paper begins by reviewing the relevant literature with respect to measuring 
educational quality. Section 2 will separate quality into actual and perceived measures, and then 
discuss the associations of actual measures in section 2.1, perceived measures in 2.2, and the 
implications for perceived measures in 2.3. Section 3 will review the data source in 3.1, describe 
the model and variables in 3.2, and explain the intuition behind the model in 3.3. The results will 
be explained in section 4 and conclusions and results in sections 5 and 6.   
1.  Literature Review 
The definition for the quality of education has been defined in multiple ways. Longanecker 
and Blanco (2003) define quality as the how and the who, which refers to the teaching methods 
and the teachers. Akareem and Hossain (2014) define quality of education as the quality of 
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students, faculty credentials, academic features, and administrative supports. Mitchell (2010) 
describes quality as the student’s perceptions, quantifiable elements, course design and outside 
factors. Economists have criticized almost all these approaches to measure quality. When 
thinking about how to measure quality, it is also important to consider two factors: the ability to 
measure the independent variables and whether the variables encompass all aspects of quality.  
There are criticisms that many of the early definitions of quality are flawed because they do 
not encompass the whole student experience or measure intangible variables. Early literature 
attempted to estimate the labor market effects of college quality to determine how higher quality 
colleges affected wages (Black and Smith, 2004). The measures of quality used in these studies 
include inputs such as student-to-falculty ratio and endowment per student, both of which were 
found to be significant in the labor market. Critiques of these types of methods involve being 
unable to account for variables such as improvement of a student’s problem solving skills or 
motivation to learn. Black and Smith (2004) argue that there is a selection bias in estimating 
college quality because more motivated and able students will self-select into better colleges. 
Therefore, those colleges are perceived to have a higher level of education, when in fact, it is the 
student, not the college, that provides a higher outcome. In other words, how can the student’s 
ability be separated from the measure of college quality? 
One way to avoid this problem would be to measure quality by what Bennet (2001) defined 
as the value-added approach. This approach measures student improvement, and is the difference 
between the student’s attainments immediately after college and the attainments they already had 
upon entering college. Student ability would be held constant, and only the benefits of the 
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college would be measured. While this would be the most accurate approach, Bennet (2001) 
himself admits to fundamental flaws in obtaining data for these measures. 1  
 Because a student’s improvement is hard to measure, Bennet suggests that the second-
best approach would be to measure outcomes such as GRE test scores or accolades such as the 
Rhodes, Watson, or Fulbright awards. Retention rates are one of the most used indicators for 
outcomes because they imply that the students were satisfied enough by the school’s services to 
return for the next year. Even so, retention rates cannot be the sole indictor of quality as they do 
not show how much a student has learned (Bennet, 2001). Unfortunately, there is no set formula 
for estimating student quality. For the purposes of this paper, quality will be measured with a 
combination of inputs and outputs that can be measured despite the flaws of each.  
2.  Measures of Quality Used in this Study 
Unlike the previous literature, this paper attempts to separate variables that describe 
actual quality and variables that describe perceived quality. Buss, Parker and Rivenburg, (2004) 
categorize these measures into direct attributes and indirect attributes. Direct attributes are the 
tangible actions and quantifiable measures a university takes to improve the quality of life for 
students. Indirect measures involve summary rankings or ratings of colleges by a third party 
(Buss, Parker, and Rivenburg, 2004). The most well-known example of an indirect measure is 
the U.S News and World Report, the validity of which will be discussed further in this paper. 
2.1  Direct Measures 
From a cost perspective, it is reasonable to assume that the more money a university 
spends to improve education, the better that education will be. In their study, Pike et al. (2010) 
                                                 
1 Bennet mentions finding value-added measures might be costly and complex. Another 
complication is that these benefits may have a lagged effect that is not apparent immediately 
after graduation. Therefore, quantifying and identifying the lagged effect is not feasible.  
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assessed how students responded to increases in expenditures. Students were given a survey 
measuring cognitive outcomes with four options to rank their college experience regarding 
general education, writing and speaking effectively, quantitative analysis, and critical thinking. 
The survey was scaled on a 1-4-point system. The points were as follows:  4) Very Much, 3) 
Quite a Bit, 2) Some, and 1) Very Little. The scaled responses 1-4 were respectively 0.00, 33.33, 
66.67, and 100, and averaged to obtain a mean score between 0 and 100. The study found that 
better expenditures were related to certain institutional characteristics such as academic 
challenge, student faculty interaction, enriching experiences, student engagement, and a 
supportive environment. They found that improved institutional characteristics accounted for 
nearly 17% of the variance across in cognitive means across institutions in their survey.  Their 
conclusion suggested that money did matter for a college student’s learning and development 
(Pike et al., 2010)2. These results provide support for using educational costs and financial 
investment as a proxy for educational quality.  
In this analysis, variables that are representative of financial investment will be used. 
Endowment per student, student-to-faculty ratio, and financial aid per student are all measures of 
inputs that directly affect the student and learning environment. A larger endowment allows the 
university to provide better academic facilities, and offer better learning opportunities for 
students. A lower student-to-faculty ratio implies that a college spends a larger amount to hire an 
adequate number of faculty for their student body. The more money spent on scholarships or 
financial aid allows the student body to consist of the best cohort available. These measures of 
financial investment increase educational quality.  
                                                 
2 Only public schools were surveyed in Pike et al.’s study, and the degree to which these 
results may apply to private universities Is unknown.  
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2.2  Indirect Measures  
 Among the most controversial measures of quality is reputation. Students have begun to 
rely more on subjective rankings when making a college decision. There is no question that 
guidebooks and magazines that rank reputation play a major role in where students choose to 
apply to college. The U.S News & World Report “ranking” includes around 1400 colleges and in 
the 2013, the digital magazine had over 20 million monthly views (U.S News and World Report, 
2017). With numerous colleges, there is a growing rivalry among universities to stand out and 
attract the best students (Monks and Ehrenberg, 1999). Technology has made college rankings 
highly visible to prospective students, and universities have responded by expending resources 
on improving rank that might have otherwise gone to improving student productivity or the 
learning environment (Dill, 2005). 
There are a couple of ways in which colleges might “beat the system”. In Kuh and 
Pascarella’s (2004) study, they found college selectivity and educational practices to improve 
student learning were uncorrelated with each other. In other words, a more selective school 
would not necessarily have a better learning environment. Dill argues that perhaps this is because 
universities invest money in administrative efforts to lure potential students instead of improving 
quality (Dill, 2005). Another criticism of ranking systems is that it encourages grade inflation 
within universities, which makes the student body look more impressive without improving the 
academic rigor of the university. A study that surveyed students in the 1990’s reported that 
students spent significantly less time in academic related activities than their predecessors did, 
but had higher grades (Kuh, 1999). Grade inflation may even lower the quality of the college as 
it lowers a student’s motivation for academic effort (Dill, 2005).  
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 An alternative to the U.S News and World report is the NSSE benchmarks3.  The 
benchmarks are calculated using responses from the college student report, a survey that asks 
first year and senior students to report levels of engagement in activities that indicate a good 
learning environment. These benchmarks include 1) Level of Academic Challenge 2) Active and 
Collaborative learning 3) Student interaction with Faculty Members 4) Enriching Educational 
Experiences and 5) Supportive Campus environment (Pike, 2004). The benchmarks were 
designed to measure how an institution could improve and provide a more accurate indication of 
actual quality.4 Pike measured these benchmarks against the U.S News and World Report 
ranking and found few statistically significant correlations.5 His results imply that the quality of 
an institution is not representative of the institution’s reputation and rank (Pike, 2004). 
Therefore, in this analysis, the U.S News and World Report ranking will serve as a proxy for 
perceived quality.  
2.3  Implications of Indirect Measures  
While the U.S News and World Report rank may not directly reflect quality, it does 
affect student and administrative decisions. Monks’ and Ehrenberg’s (1999) study on the impact 
of the U.S News & World Report Rankings and college admissions outcomes show that a lower 
rank results in a college being less selective in their applicant pool. This in turn leads to not as 
                                                 
3 There is little research done to show that the NSSE survey yields different results from the U.S 
News and World Report. It is important to note that scores from the NSSE survey are based on 
responses from the students themselves. The survey therefore cannot account for differing 
student interpretations of these indications across different institutions.   
4 While the NSSE would be a good indication of actual quality in this analysis, it does not 
provide the individual scores across school needed for comparison. 
5 Only selectivity and enriching educational experiences were significant. Pike explains that this 
relationship could have resulted because more selective institutions may indeed offer more 
opportunities for student to get involved. Other theories are that selective institutions happen to 
be smaller and smaller colleges have more opportunities for students to engage. He also admits 
to the possibility that the relationship was completely random.   
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many students enrolling in the college and a lower yield rate. The lower yield rates result in a 
lower SAT scores for the incoming class, indicating that the level of student quality decreased 
for the entering class. Alternatively, a higher rank may attract a higher quality student (Monks 
and Ehrenberg, 1999). While this study was conducted around twenty years ago the relevance 
remains. A higher reputation has implications for student quality that were not a result of the 
university’s characteristics.  
Reputation may attract more competent students. Higher student quality may increase the 
educational rate of return due to peer effects, which are the positive or negative spill overs of 
people grouped together. Carrell, Fullerton, and West (1999) estimated the peer effects on 
college achievement for peer groups of 30 at a naval academy. Individuals were randomly 
assigned to groups and had limited ability to interact with people outside the group. They found 
positive peer effects in freshman academic performance measured by SAT score and freshman 
year fall grades. The results suggest that the benefit of studying with peers with higher SAT 
scores is significant as it increases the success of the entire group (Carrell, Fullerton, and West, 
1999). Therefore, a smarter cohort of students will provide a benefit, the extent of which is 
unmeasurable.  
Reputation undeniably opens doors for students that might not have been available at less 
prestigious universities. A study in 1995, examined the relationship between prestige and career 
success of 1388 executives. Those who went to Ivy League schools enjoyed higher expected 
earnings of around $600,000 over a 20-year span than those people who went to lower ranked 
schools controlling for educational quality (Tang et al., 2004). Businesses compete for the best 
employees, and they look to universities with higher accolades to find them. With connected 
alumni, and better networking opportunities, qualified candidates who attend schools with a 
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higher reputation are associated with having better qualifications (Tang et al., 2004). Employers 
think that those universities are better equipped to invest in the human capital of their students.  
One of the challenges of this paper is understanding what impact reputation has, and 
analyzing how tuition reflects that impact. This paper acknowledges that the U.S News and 
World Ranking has quality implications that are not measurable. However, this paper hopes to 
understand the relative relationship between perceived quality and tuition. If a university sets a 
tuition higher than the perceived and actual benefit, they are charging beyond their value.  
3.  Methodology 
3.1  Data Source 
The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) consists of information found 
from a set of surveys conducted annually from every college, university, or institution that 
participates in financial student aid programs. The most recent and updated year for IPEDS was 
the 2014-2015 school year. Therefore, only information from that year is used in this data set. 
All variables used in this model except for the ranking variable were retrieved from the IPEDS 
data set. The data in this analysis contains information from 144 liberal arts colleges which were 
selected for the following reason: private institutions may set tuition charges whereas public 
institutions rely more on public funding. To analyze the relationship between price and perceived 
quality, the university must set the price instead of taking it as given. Another criterion was that 
the schools had to be ranked in the U.S News report for the 2014-2015 academic year. Schools, 
like the Naval Airforce academy although ranked, were not eligible because they are free for 
students. Colleges which promised 100% financial aid were also excluded from the data set 
because in those institutions, it is hard to measure perceived quality because no one pays the full 
price.  
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3.2 Model, Variables, and Descriptive Statistics 
When applied to a market economy, in higher education, the university acts as the supplier 
and the students are the consumers. Therefore, tuition is the price of the service the university 
provides (Baba, Yonezawa, 1998). In a well-functioning market, tuition should then reflect the 
different aspects of quality, and higher tuition should imply higher quality. In the hopes of 
analyzing this relationship, tuition is used as the dependent variable, and factors that influence 
college quality or perception of quality are used as independent variables.  
This study will define price in two ways. Tuition will represent the yearlong cost of college 
for tuition, room and board, cost of books, and mandatory fees. This price is commonly known 
as the sticker price as it is the most visible to prospective students. However not all students pay 
the sticker price because some students receive federal aid, which are grants received on the 
federal, state or local government level or by institution. The second measure, average net 
tuition, is defined as the tuition less the average number of discounts, which include financial aid 
and scholarships. All three variables, tuition, net tuition, and financial aid will be used as 
dependent variables to understand how the measures of quality interact and differ across models. 
These variables are in log form because to represent the marginal effects of the dependent 
variables.  
The empirical model for the relationship between tuition and measures of quality are 
specified in equation 1: 
(1) Log(Ti)=𝛽o+ 1(Log(rank))i + 2(Log(SAT))i + 3(Log(endowment))i + 4(student)i + 
5(yield)i + 6(retention)i +7(need_met)i +T 
And the empirical model to describe the relationship between net tuition and measures of quality 
are specified in equation 2:   
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(2) Log(NTi)= o + 1(Log(rank))i + 2(Log(SAT))i + 3(Log(endowment))i + 4(student)i + 
5(yield)i + 6(retention)i +7(need_met)i +T 
A empirical model looking at financial aid is included as stated in equation 3: 
(3) Log(AvgFinAidi)= o + 1(Log(rank))i +2(Log(SAT))i + 3(Log(endowment))i + 
4(student)i + 5(yield)i + 6(retention)i +7(need_met)i +T 
Where: 
Ti  = Tuition 
NTi  = Net Tuition 
Finaid = Average Financial Aid  
rank  = U.S News and World Ranking 
SAT  = SAT score 
endowment  = endowment per student 
student  = student-to-faculty ratio 
yield  = number enrolled students/ number of admitted students 
retention  = retention rate 
need_met = meets 100% demonstrated financial aid   
1-7  = estimated coefficients for tuition equation 
1-7  = estimated coefficients for net tuition equation 
1-7 = estimated coefficients for the average financial aid equation 
 
Quality factors are divided into two categories, the direct and indirect. Indirect measures are 
measured by the rankings for the U.S News and World Report to measure perceived quality. In 
the beginning of this paper, a relationship between perceived quality and tuition was 
hypothesized. As perceived quality increases by a more favorable rank, both tuition and net 
tuition would be expected to increase. Rank is logged because it most likely has diminishing 
marginal effects. A change in ranking from 1st place to 2nd place will have a more dramatic 
impact than a change from 145th place to 146th place. While analyzing the relationship between 
perceived quality and price, actual measures of quality are included in the model to be held 
constant. One way to account for student quality, is to include SAT scores of the entering class. 
 13 
SAT scores measure the ability of the students, which will somewhat control for peer effects. 
SAT is in log form because a one unit change will not capture the effect of SAT as much as a 
percent change due to the magnitude of the variable. Better students go to better schools, so as 
the entering class’ SAT scores increase, tuition and net tuition are also expected to increase. 
 The direct variables include both inputs and outputs that are measurable and reflective of 
actual quality. The rationale behind using both inputs and outputs is that inputs reflect quality 
from an administrative perspective and outputs reflect quality from a student’s perspective. In 
this model, inputs are endowment per student and student-to-faculty ratio and yield rates. 
Endowment and student to faculty ratio are measures of financial investment and financial 
investment increases quality, there should be a positive correlation with these variables and 
tuition and net tuition. Yield should measure student demand, and an increase in demand should 
correlate with an increase in tuition. The output for direct measures is the retention rate to 
measure student satisfaction. The higher the number of students that want to return to the 
college, the better the experience or quality of the college. Intuitively, a more expensive college 
may be able to provide students with the resources to have a better experience. Higher retention 
rates can then be expected to positively correlate with tuition and net tuition. In order to 
acknowledge different policies regarding pricing, a dummy variable capturing whether the 
schools meets 100% financial aid is included in the model. The rationale for this variable is that 
colleges that meet 100% percent financial aid will charge a higher tuition and net tuition to 
subsidize needier students.  
Financial aid is determined through the need of the student body uninhibited by quality 
measures. The expectation would be that if a school meets 100% demonstrated need, their 
average financial aid would be higher. Also, if a school has better resources such as endowment, 
 14 
then a school would be able to offer better financial aid. However, the directionality and 
magnitudes of the other variables impact on financial is unclear. Refer to Table 1 for descriptive 
statistics for the variables in this model and Table 2 for further explanation of variables and 
definitions. 
3.3  Theoretical Framework 
 For a consumer to judge quality based on price, the assumption is that the consumer 
knows the price. Typically, tuition is the price advertised by the school and is more visible to 
perspective students. Net tuition is less visible due to the complex process to receive financial 
aid. One of the complexities of financial aid is federal loans, and because people inherently 
discount the future, students cannot fully understand the impact of loans plus accumulated 
interest. Also, the financial package differs based on need, which is different for everyone. 
Intuitively, if a school uses a more favorable reputation to increase their price, then it would be 
apparent in the more visible measure of price. Therefore, the coefficient for rank in the tuition 
equation, 1, is expected to be greater than 1, the coefficient for rank in the net tuition equation. 
If no price inflation exists, then the impact for rank should be the same for both tuition and net 
tuition, meaning 1 is not statistically different from 1. 
4. Results and Discussion 
 A simple OLS model was used to estimate three basic models on the effects of perceived 
quality on tuition, net tuition, and financial aid.  
4.1 Model 1 
 The first model simply includes the measures of quality. The coefficient for 1 the log of 
rank is significant in the tuition model and 1 is insignificant in the net tuition model. This 
suggests that holding actual quality constant, the perceived measure of quality will increase 
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tuition which is consistent with the theory that colleges increase tuition based on better 
reputation. The coefficient for the log of rank can be interpreted as for a one percent decrease or 
better in rank, tuition is correlated to increase by .071% ceteris paribus.  
The model is fairly good at capturing measures of actual quality as all variables are 
significant in the tuition model with the exception of SAT score. As measures of quality increase 
such as higher retention rates and lower student to faculty ratios, tuition also increases. Tuition 
and endowment per student have a negative elasticity, but an explanation could be that schools 
with bigger endowments do not have to charge as high of a tuition to cover operating expenses. 
SAT score was insignificant which means that it did not capture the expected quality 
implications. Many liberal arts schools emphasize the importance of looking at the big picture of 
a student’s application during the admissions process and not solely on test scores.  
In fact, some colleges choose to forgo the SAT component of the application altogether 
by providing students with a test optional section. If this is the case, SAT score would be a bad 
indicator in determining how the admissions process judges student quality, and it explains the 
lack of significance in this model. The directionality of admissions yield is not what was 
expected earlier. If yield is a proxy for demand, logically tuition would increase as yield does. 
This result can be interpreted that students who apply to lower quality schools do not have many 
options, and therefore are forced to enroll. In this way, schools with lower tuition and overall 
lower quality could have higher yield rates. 
  In the financial aid model, a 1 percent decrease in rank will increase financial aid by 
approximately .14%. The interaction between tuition and financial aid makes intuitive sense 
because when schools increase tuition due to ranking they must increase financial aid to meet the 
same levels of need. While the average financial aid should theoretically be determined by 
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student need, the larger the resources for a college, typically the better the financial aid policies. 
Higher student to faculty ratios imply that colleges do not have the resources to employ a larger 
number or faculty and therefore are less able to provide as much financial aid. Endowment is a 
measure of resources as well, but this effect is captured in driving tuition prices down instead of 
pushing financial aid up. For yield rate, the tuition model indicated that yield and tuition are 
negatively correlated. According to the correlation matrix in table 4, tuition and financial aid 
have a significant strong positive correlation. In this way, financial aid and yield should also be 
negatively correlated.  
 In the net tuition model, the independent variables that are significant are also significant 
and in the same direction for the tuition model. Because these variables effect the cost that most 
people pay, they should be better at portraying an effect of actual quality. Student to faculty ratio 
is insignificant, which is surprising. Perhaps this effect is captured in the ability to give more 
financial aid, and therefore means that the net tuition and resources implied by lower student to 
faculty ratios are not correlated. Also, the adjusted R2 for net tuition is lower than the adjusted R2 
for the other models, which indicates that there are other independent factors that impact net 
tuition not captured in this model.  
4.2 Model 2 
 In addition to measures of quality, universities use prices to influence the diversity of the 
student cohort. According to The Vice President for enrollment management at the University of 
Richmond, price is determined by a variety of different factors, but there are four main 
components and goals (Stephanie Dupaul, 2018). The first is to keep within the same price range 
of other similar colleges. Admissions look at schools of similar quality and raise their prices 
comparably. The second factor is to maintain and attract a diverse student body. The logic 
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behind universities charging higher tuition is so high payers can subsidize low income students. 
To accept a larger number of students from lower socioeconomic spheres, tuition must be 
increased. Similarly, colleges want to attract students from diverse racial backgrounds, and they 
increase tuition to subsidize high ability minority students from lower socio-economic classes.  
The forth objective is to meet demand and the higher the demand, the higher the price.  
 The first model captures demand through yield rates, and regulating price in accordance 
to other colleges does not contribute to the actual quality of a university. In trying to understand 
more abstract measures of why price is set, this second model tries to grasp how diversity 
impacts tuition. The second model includes discrete variables for different racial backgrounds. 
The variables were determined from data on the IPEDS data set as the percent of each racial 
group that was self-identified by the student body at each college. The descriptive statistics are 
shown on table 4. Nonresidential is synonymous with international students, and the other 
category encompasses all the smaller minorities on college campuses such as native American 
and native Hawaiian. As the percentages of minorities increase, tuition and financial aid would 
be expected to increase and net price should decrease. Financial aid policies towards 
international students tend to be less generous and therefore there should be a negative 
correlation between nonresidential, and tuition and financial aid. The modified base equation is 
as follows where  is  for the tuition model,  for the net tuition model, and  for the financial 
aid model: 
Log(Ti), Log(NTi) and Log(Finaidi)=o+ 1(Log(rank))i + 2(Log(SAT))i + 
3(Log(endowment))i + 4(student)i + 5(yield)i + 6(retention)i +7(need_met)i 
+8(Asian)i +9(Black)i +10(Hispanic)i +11(non-residential)i +12(other)i +T 
Where: 
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Ti  = Tuition 
NTi  = Net Tuition 
Finaid = Average Financial Aid  
rank  = U.S News and World Ranking 
SAT  = SAT score 
endowment  = endowment per student 
student  = student-to-faculty ratio 
yield  = number enrolled students/ number of admitted students 
retention  = retention rate 
need_met = meets 100% demonstrated financial aid   
Asian = percentage of Asian students 
Black = percentage of African American students 
Hispanic  = Percentage of Hispanic students 
Non-residential = Percentage of international students 
other = Percentages of the rest of minority students  
1-12  = estimated coefficients for base model 
 
 The results captured in model 3 show that the quality variables are unaffected for the 
tuition model and net tuition model. The only significant term for the tuition model is the 
coefficient for other. Additionally, a one percent increase in other minorities does not affect the 
average amount of financial aid compared to a one percent increase in the percentage of white 
people. This suggests that having a higher number of minority students in other does not 
correlate with better financial aid, and therefore high payers do not have to subsidize those 
students. A possible explanation is that the racial groups that make up other would further 
diversify the colleges. Therefore, colleges may measure a more diverse student body as a 
measure of quality and increase tuition.  
The log of SAT score, Hispanic, and nonresidential are significant in the financial aid 
model. For a one percent increase in SAT score, financial aid decreases by .692%. Students who 
do well on the SAT characteristically have the resources to higher tutors and take classes, and 
because they have those resources they do not need as much financial aid. Hispanic is consistent 
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that an increase in the percent of a minority group increases financial aid if typically, that group 
comes from a lower socioeconomic class. The direction of non-residential is confusing, but a 
possible justification may be that international students are attracted to higher perceived quality 
schools. The marginal benefit of a US university would have to be higher than the marginal 
benefit from a school in that student’s home country. Consequently, those students attend 
schools with better reputations, higher tuitions, and in turn schools that give higher financial aid.  
 The main takeaway from this model is that even accounting for different demographics, 
the coefficient for the log of rank 1 on tuition is significant and the same coefficient, 1 is not 
significant for the log of net tuition. This still confirms the theory that perceived levels of quality 
are seen in tuition and therefore getting a diverse student body and measures of quality do not 
explain price increases. The adjusted R2 is higher for model 2 than for model 1, for both the 
tuition and the financial aid models, but not for net tuition. This implies that the inclusion of 
racial groups explains the model of tuition and financial aid better, but only slightly.  
4.3 Model 3 
 The third model captures the effect of different income brackets on tuition, net tuition and 
financial aid. The data was retrieved from the IPEDS data set, which separates income into five 
brackets. The variables were determined by taking the number of incoming first year 
undergraduate students in each income bracket on financial aid and dividing them by the total 
number of first time enrolled first year students. They are discrete variables that represent the 
percentages of each income bracket in the freshman class. The modified base model is as follows 
where  represents  for the tuition model,  for the net tuition model, and  for the financial aid 
model:  
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Log(Ti), Log(NTi) and Log(Finaidi)=o+ 1(Log(rank))i + 2(Log(SAT))i + 
3(Log(endowment))i + 4(student)i + 5(yield)i + 6(retention)i +7(need_met)i 
+8(Group1)i +9(Group2)i +10(Group3)i +11(Group4)i +12(Group5)i +T 
Where: 
Ti  = Tuition 
NTi  = Net Tuition 
Finaid = Average Financial Aid  
rank  = U.S News and World Ranking 
SAT  = SAT score 
endowment  = endowment per student 
student  = student-to-faculty ratio 
yield  = number enrolled students/ number of admitted students 
retention  = retention rate 
need_met = meets 100% demonstrated financial aid   
Group1 = percentage of freshmen with incomes of $0-30,000 
Group2 = percentage of freshmen with incomes of $30,001-48,000 
Group3  = percentage of freshmen with incomes of $48,001-75,000 
Group4l = percentage of freshmen with incomes of $75,001-110,000 
Group5 = percentage of freshmen with incomes of 110,001 or more  
1-12  = estimated coefficients for base model 
 
 
Surprisingly the descriptive statistics in table 4 show that the average percentage for 
students in the fifth income bracket whose families have assets of $110,000 or more is the 
highest with a mean of 21.4%. An explanation for such a high statistic compared to the rest of 
the income brackets is that liberal arts schools tend to attract higher income students. Students 
from lower income families would choose a state or community college, where the initial price 
tag is much lower.  
 This logic is consistent with the results in model 3 for the tuition and net tuition models. 
The income variables are discrete with the percentage of students not on financial aid being the 
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excluded party. Group 2 and Group 3 with income brackets of 30,0001- 48,000 and 48,001-
75,000 are significant with negative coefficients. The interpretation is that a one percent increase 
in the percentages of group 2 and 3 will correlate with a decrease in tuition of .9% and .81% 
relative to students who are not on financial aid. The average cost of tuition is 54,020.12, for 
group 2 and 3, this is a cost that exceeds or is most of their families’ income. The intuition 
behind this is that students in these income brackets will self-select into lower priced liberal arts 
colleges. These students also generally might not have had the resources such as a private school 
education to get into highly selective liberal arts colleges, and chose less selective colleges with 
lower price points. The same logic can be used for why the coefficients for group 2 and group 3 
are significant and negative for the net tuition model. Group five is significant for the net tuition 
model as well, but that can be explained simply. Price is not as much of a deterrent for this 
income bracket as much as it is for groups 2 and 3. Therefore these students believe they can 
attend higher priced schools, and higher income families do not need as much financial aid 
driving net tuition up.  
 In this model, holding student socioeconomic class constant, will make retention rates 
insignificant for the tuition and net tuition model. It is unclear what causes this change because 
retention rates depend on individual preferences and students choose to stay at colleges or 
universities for a variety of reasons. One possible theory could be that reasons for staying at a 
college may be likeness of fit, and if a student feels that he or she is dissimilar to the student 
body, they will drop out. Keeping the socioeconomic makeup of the student body constant 
controls in part for likeness of fit because students of the same socioeconomic class may have 
more characteristics in common. Colleges with a lower tuition may attract people of similar 
socioeconomic background and a student’s sense of relatedness to their peers increases. 
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Therefore, schools that have higher tuitions and net tuitions may not correlate with better 
satisfaction.  
 In the net tuition model, the coefficient for endowment becomes insignificant, and the 
coefficient for meeting 100% demonstrated need becomes more significant. Net tuition is 
determined by subtracting the average amount of financial aid from tuition, and financial aid is 
determined based on student need. It would make intuitive sense that the more resources a 
university has does not impact the need of the student cohort controlling for whether a school 
meets 100% of demonstrated need and the percentages of students in each income bracket. Then 
if a school is dedicated to meeting full need given the same socioeconomic diversity, then the 
amount of financial aid given increases and the net tuition will be lower.  
 Overall controlling for socioeconomic characteristics the measures of quality are not 
effected dramatically. The coefficient in the tuition model for rank, 1, is greater and more 
significant than the coefficient for net tuition, 1, which indicates that there are price increases 
correlated with a better reputation and higher perceived levels of quality regardless of student 
need.  
5. Limitations and Future Research 
 First, the results of this study examine correlation, not causation. It is difficult to tell if 
perceived quality causes price increases and therefore the results should be read with skepticism. 
The limitations of this study also lie in the inability to accurately estimate college quality as 
discussed in the literature review. College quality in this model can only be a prediction, and will 
never accurately depict the whole effect of college quality. Many measures of quality can be 
interpreted in a variety of different ways. For example, retention rates can measure student 
satisfaction or if the student cohort has a low ability, many students would flunk out and 
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retention rate measures student aptitude. It is difficult to standardize what these measures of 
quality capture across schools. Also, it is unreasonable to think that measures of actual quality 
are not included in the U.S News and World Report. Factors include SAT score, financial 
indicators, alumni giving, and retentions rates (U.S News and World Report, 2017). It would be 
naive to think that U.S News and World report does not have some indicators for quality. These 
models hope to combat this issue by including actual quality measures in the model to control for 
the effects of actual quality, but the extent to how well this model has this effect is unknown.  
 Further research might include better measures of quality for both inputs and outputs. 
This could include obtaining first year salaries for recent graduates or conducting satisfaction 
surveys to better capture individual preferences for students. Another study going forward would 
be to compare national universities and liberal arts colleges. While they have different objectives 
and attract different types of students, perspective students compare their relative values. A 
student does not choose between one type of college, but typically decides between state schools, 
national universities, and liberal arts colleges. It would be interesting to see how perceived 
quality impacts both national universities and liberal arts schools if actual quality can be 
standardized between the two classifications of colleges.  
6. Conclusion 
 Students judged quality based on price, and therefore higher priced universities are seen 
to have better worth than lower priced universities. Despite the cost the average student pays, 
which is net tuition, students perceptions of value are still caused by tuition. Controlling for 
quality and different incentives for price regulation, all three models indicated that the coefficient 
for the log of rank,1, in the tuition model is greater than the coefficient for the log of rank, 1, in 
the net tuition model. As rank represents perceived levels of quality, the effect is apparent in the 
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more visible indicator, tuition. There is no such significant correlation in the net tuition model, 
which represents the real marginal cost because most students pay net tuition. If colleges did not 
increase price to make their universities look more prestigious, then rank should affect net tuition 
and tuition similarly. This indicates that there is a positive correlation between perceived levels 
of quality and tuition, and colleges may increase their prices to gain a better reputation.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Quality Variables  Source: IPEDS 2014-2015 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Average Net Tuition 144 25,993.01 5,106.63 14,312 40,550 
Tuition 144 54,020.12 7,879.99 25,872 66,627 
Rank 144 76.7 44.2 1 148 
Retention Rate 144 87.4 6.6 67 98 
Student to Faculty Ratio  144 10.43 1.61 6 14 
Endowment per student 144 206,460.17 235,549.78 18,890 1,332,569 
SAT Score 144 1318.28 101.29 1090 1570 
Average Financial Aid  144 27,833.31 7,553.06 5,845 47,145 
Yield Rate (%) 144 27.11 10.47 12 72 
Need_Met 144 0.3194 0.4678 0 1 
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Table 2. Variable Definitions 
Variable  Definition 
Average Net Tuition The Average Net Tuition is the sticker price less any discounts received. 
Discounts include grant aid or scholarships from federal, state, or local 
governments or the institution. Other sources of grant aid are excluded.  
Tuition Tuition is the sticker price. The sticker price consists of the total cost of 
books, room and board, mandatory fees, and tuition for one year at college. 
Average Financial Aid  The average financial aid is the total amount of grant aid on the federal, state 
or local government level and institutional grants divided by the number of 
full time undergraduates  
Rank Ranks were as published by the U.S News and World Report rank for the 
2014-2015 school year.  
SAT SAT score was determined from the combined scores from the critical 
reading and math sections. The maximum score is 1600. The writing section 
was excluded because some schools do not require scores for this section, 
and it was no consistent for the schools use in the data set.  
Endowment Endowment assets are gross investments of endowment funds, term 
endowment funds, and funds functioning as endowment for the institution 
and any of its foundations and other affiliated organizations. Endowment 
funds are funds whose principal is nonexpendable (true endowment) and that 
are intended to be invested to provide earnings for institutional use. 
Commonly endowments provide annual income to alieve tuition burdens. It 
is calculated by divided the total amount of assets by the number of full time 
undergraduate and graduate students. The rationale behind including all 
students is that the endowment provides funds for all students.  
 
Student-to-faculty 
Ratio 
Student to Faculty Ratio is the number of full time undergraduates enrolled 
divided by the number of full time instructional staff for undergraduates.  
Yield Rate  The number of full time undergraduate first years enrolled divided by the 
number of first year undergraduate admitted students 
 
Retention Rate The full-time retention rate is the percent of the fall full-time cohort from the 
prior year minus exclusions from the fall full-time cohort that re-enrolled at 
the institution as either full- or part-time in the current year. 
Need_Met a dummy variable for meeting 100% demonstrated need (1) or not (0) 
 
Groups 1-5 The number of first time undergraduate first year students on financial aid in 
each income bracket divided by the total number of first time undergraduate 
first year students  
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix between Tuition, Financial Aid, and Net Tuition 
 Tuition Average Financial Aid Net Tuition 
Tuition 1 0.78694 0.40741 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
Average Financial Aid  
 
1 -0.24033  
(-0.0037) 
Average Net Price  
  
1 
  
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for Racial Backgrounds 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Asian 144 4.7% 4.0% 0.00% 24.1% 
Black 144 6.6% 11.0% 0.00% 94.3% 
Hispanic 144 7.3% 4.9% 0.30% 44.4% 
White 144 67.5% 15.3% 0.00% 93.3% 
nonresidential 144 6.7% 5.0% 0.00% 27.3% 
Other 144 7.30% 5.00% 0.02% 28% 
 
 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Different Income Levels Source: IPEDS 2014-2015 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Group 1 ($0-30,000) 144 10.4% 6.0% 2.3% 32.7% 
Group 2 ($30,001-48,000) 144 7.2% 3.2% 2.0% 15.8% 
Group 3 ($48,001-75,000) 144 10.3% 3.9% 3.0% 21.3% 
Group 4 ($75,001-110,000) 144 12.5% 5.3% 3.2% 37.0% 
Group 5 (>$110,000) 144 21.4% 6.8% 6.7% 47.2% 
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Model 1. Measures of Quality on Tuition, Financial Aid, and Net Tuition IPEDS 2014-2015 
 Log (Tuition) Log (Financial Aid) Log (Net Tuition) 
Intercept 11.38  
(8.19)*** 
13.531 
 (3.66)*** 
7.3599  
(3.22)***  
Log (rank) -0.071  
(-3.27)*** 
-0.1408  
(-3.19)*** 
0.0166 
 (0.43)  
Log (SAT Score) 0.037 
 (0.19) 
-0.1853 
 (-0.36) 
0.316  
(1) 
Log of Endowment -0.036  
(-2.09)** 
-0.0278 
 (-0.92) 
-0.044  
(-1.85)* 
Student to Faculty Ratio -0.034 
 (-3.41)*** 
-0.0588 
 (-3.18)*** 
-0.011 
 (-0.87) 
Admission Yield -0.007  
(-4.7)*** 
-0.0071  
(-2.33)** 
-0.008  
(-4.82)*** 
Retention Rate 0.0052  
(2.07)** 
-0.0043 
 (-0.89) 
0.015  
(4.83)*** 
Meets 100% Demonstrated 
need 
0.08185  
(2.67)*** 
0.22612  
(4.01)*** 
-0.05829 
 (-1.16) 
Adjusted R2 .5881 .5444 .2147 
Notes: (*,**,***) Statistically Significant from zero at the (10%, 5%, 1%) level, white corrected t-values  
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Model 2. Measures of Quality and Diversity on Tuition, Financial Aid, and Net Tuition  
Source: IPEDS 2014-2015 
 
Log (Tuition) Log (Financial Aid) Log( Net Tuition) 
Intercept 12.227  
(9.14)*** 
17.037  
(6.22)*** 
6.806  
(2.75)*** 
Log Rank -0.074  
(-3.41)*** 
-0.168  
(-3.87)*** 
0.032  
(0.8) 
Log SAT -0.1  
(-0.54) 
-0.692  
(-1.97)* 
0.381  
(1.13) 
Log Endowment -0.034  
(-2.1)** 
-0.024  
(-0.86) 
-0.045  
(-1.81)* 
Student to Faculty Ratio -0.031  
(-3.27)*** 
-0.052  
(-3.16)*** 
-0.012  
(-0.88) 
Yield Rates -0.007  
(-4.62)*** 
-0.007  
(-2.51)** 
-0.008  
(-4.77)*** 
Retention Rate 0.006  
(2.45)** 
-0.004  
(-0.83) 
0.015  
(5.19)*** 
Meets 100% Need 0.067  
(2.39)** 
0.208  
(4.09)*** 
-0.061  
(-1.12) 
Asian -0.098  
(-0.33) 
-0.572  
(-1.03) 
0.566  
(1.11) 
Black -0.086  
(-0.7) 
-0.443  
(-1.54) 
0.136  
(1.15) 
Hispanic 0.228  
(1.31) 
0.574  
(1.87)* 
-0.244  
(-1.02) 
nonresidential 0.268  
(1.27) 
0.816  
(2)** 
-0.115  
(-0.35) 
Other 0.375  
(1.69)* 
0.39  
(1.05) 
0.106  
(0.23) 
Adjusted R2 .5975 .5810 .1989 
Notes: (*,**,***) Statistically Significant from zero at the (10%, 5%, 1%) level, white corrected t-values  
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Model 3. Measures of Quality and Socioeconomic Class on Tuition, Average Financial 
Aid and Net Tuition Source: IPEDS 2014-2015  
Log (Tuition) Log (Financial Aid) Log (Net Tuition) 
Intercept 12.99 
 (9.61)*** 
14.99  
(4.91)*** 
9.98 
 (4.65)*** 
Log (rank) -0.07  
(-3.62)*** 
-0.14  
(-3.16)** 
0.02 
 (0.44) 
Log (SAT Score) -0.11 
 (-0.58) 
-0.33  
(-0.79) 
0.08 
 (0.27) 
Log of Endowment -0.03 
 (-2.36)** 
-0.04 
 (-1.17) 
-0.03  
(-1.38) 
Student to Faculty Ratio -0.03  
(-3.54)*** 
-0.06  
(-3.2)*** 
-0.01 
 (-0.96) 
Admission Yield -0.01  
(-4.85)*** 
-0.01  
(-2.43)** 
-0.01  
(-3.53)*** 
Retention Rate -0.0003  
(-0.09) 
-0.0059 
 (-0.9) 
0.0044  
(1.05) 
Meets 100% Demonstrated 
need 
0.06  
(2.22)** 
0.21  
(3.51)*** 
-0.08 
 (-1.94)* 
Group 1 (0-30,000) -0.01 
 (-0.06) 
-0.51  
(-0.8) 
0.13  
(0.3) 
Group 2 (30,001-48,000) -0.9 
 (-2.23)** 
-0.23 
 (-0.27) 
-1.62 
 (-2.5)** 
Group 3 (48,001-75,000) -0.81  
(-2.28)** 
0.25 
 (0.38) 
-1.68 
 (-2.93)*** 
Group 4 (75,001-110,000) -0.29 
 (-1.47) 
-0.32  
(-0.71) 
-0.19  
(-0.51) 
Group 5 (>110,000) 0.16  
(1.24) 
-0.3 
 (-1.12) 
0.65  
(2.75)*** 
Adjusted R2 .6579 0.5336 .3921 
Notes: (*,**,***) Statistically Significant from zero at the (10%, 5%, 1%) level, white corrected t-values 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
